INTRODUCTION
In the rapidly evolving landscape of high-growth companies, the role of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) is increasingly pivotal. These individuals are tasked with steering companies towards sustainable growth while navigating complex challenges that differ markedly across various market segments. However, current remuneration models often fail to reflect the demanding nature of these roles, particularly in terms of time commitment and the associated risks. This article delves into the intricacies of NED responsibilities within high-growth environments, evaluates the shortcomings of existing remuneration structures, and proposes a governance-centric approach to align NED incentives with long-term shareholder value.
Analyzing Time Commitments and Remuneration Benchmarking for NEDs
Shareholders are generally aware of market rates and the selection of peer companies used for remuneration benchmarking. However, what's not always evident is the significant time commitment that Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) invest in their roles. Annual reports often fail to provide adequate information regarding the actual time commitments of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) in carrying out their duties.
Much of the time that NEDs devote to the companies they serve is not officially recorded, making fee calculations based on publicly available data neither sufficient nor reasonable. The connection between the actual time NEDs invest in the company and the fees they receive is often weak. Consequently, this discrepancy can result in scenarios where NEDs are not fairly compensated for their time and effort.
SHAREHOLDERS EXPECTATIONS OF ROLE
The dynamics within the small, mid, and large-cap segments of the Australian market are notably distinct. Large-capitalised producer companies, as shown by those in the ASX 100, generally present a lower risk profile for investors. This is attributed to their maturity, size and scale across sometimes diversified revenue streams of various products, services, and geographic locations. Additionally, their seasoned, professional management teams and well-established governance structures provide stability and protection for investors. These companies often distribute attractive dividends, with less capital yield in some contexts. Mid-cap firms share similar traits, although they tend to issue dividends less frequently and rely on capital growth to attract investment.Â
Both large and mid-cap companies typically possess ample resources and maintain clear demarcations between executive and non-executive roles within their governance frameworks as required by ASX and ASIC conventions and rules. Conversely, the small-, micro-cap and in some instances, the mid-landscape (growth companies), differ significantly. These companies exhibit high capital growth potential but, as with all high-potential return investments, are characterized by considerable risk and volatility, necessitating a longer-term investment perspective and active governance and stewardship. RCS refers to these types of companies as Growth Companies. For some, a few key shareholders often dominate the company's ownership, resulting in a board which may have a significant stake in the ownership of the company and/or influence over the company’s future direction.
Due to the volatility of this commodity and sector and the risk profile of Growth Companies. the NEDs would typically, and shareholders would require them to maintain a closer and more engaged relationship with management regarding the value creation agenda.
This frequently necessitates a greater requirement to take on risk in comparison to NEDs in larger and/or mature companies, where the emphasis on value creation may not be as pronounced as with a 'growth' board.
Consequently, growth boards find themselves in a unique position, enabling them to assume a distinct and more value-enhancing role, often being recognized as considerably more proactive agents of change when compared to boards in more mature settings.
This means that the roles of NEDs differ from company-to-company and a company’s stage in its life cycle should dictate in part the structure and delivery mechanisms for NED remuneration.
Developing a Governance-Focused NED Remuneration Strategy
The key challenge lies in balancing the alignment of NEDs' interests with the company's value creation agenda while safeguarding their decision-making independence. This approach, when synchronized with the company’s strategy, risk tolerance, and objectives, should adhere to the principles of good corporate governance and best practice recommendations.
According to the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations:
Principle 6: Every business decision involves an element of uncertainty and carries risks that can be managed through effective oversight and internal controls.
Principle 7: Adequate rewards are necessary to attract the skills required to achieve the performance expected by shareholders.
Principle 8: All principles hold equal importance.
It is important to recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all model for good corporate governance. Practices must be adaptable, evolving with the changing circumstances of a company and tailored to meet those specific needs.
Depending on the stage of development and the company’s specific needs, a tailored mix of remuneration elements—including cash-based fees, performance-based equity, and service-based equity—may be employed. This approach ensures that the compensation strategy is well-suited to the unique circumstances of the company, supporting sustained value creation and aligning with the principles of good corporate governance.
CONCLUSION
As high-growth companies continue to drive innovation and market expansion, the need for a remuneration framework that adequately compensates Non-Executive Directors for their critical role becomes ever more apparent. Traditional models often fall short, failing to account for the heightened responsibilities and risks these directors assume. To foster robust governance and sustained company success, it is essential to develop remuneration policies that not only reward NEDs fairly but also ensure their decisions are deeply aligned with the strategic objectives and risk profiles of the companies they serve. Implementing a governance-centric remuneration model, as discussed, could significantly enhance the effectiveness of NEDs in high-growth settings, ultimately supporting the broader goals of corporate governance and shareholder value creation.
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